Nudging has arguably become the most prominent technique in applied behavioral science. It is usually contrasted with traditional approaches to influencing behavior that focus on providing information (education), economic incentives, or government legislation and enforcement.
A nudge, as defined by Thaler and Sunstein, is
any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not.
Nudges, as identified by Cass Sunstein, include the following examples:
Other behavioral science ideas that are often applied in nudge practice include the following concepts and techniques:
In case you are not familiar with nudging yet, let’s use three of these techniques as examples:
Default options are pre-set courses of action that take effect if nothing is specified by the decision-maker. Auto-enrollment in pensions, for example, is an effective nudge to get people to enroll in retirement savings plans.
Precommitment occurs when people commit to a future action or goal. (Precommitments to engage in specific actions are generally more effective.) This technique is frequently used to promote healthy behavior, for example.
Salience is evident in the use of information that stands out, is novel, or relevant. For example, online retailers attempt to sell more of a given product option by making it visually more prominent (in size, color, etc.).
Nudges can be classified on the basis of the information-processing they trigger. A commonly used idea in behavioral science is dual-system theory, which distinguishes between automatic, fast, and non-conscious (System 1) and controlled, slow, and conscious (System 2) thinking.
Most nudges involve individuals’ automatic (System 1) thinking to some extent. In terms of the previous examples, setting defaults is effective because people are prone to inertia and uncertainty, pre-commitment works because of a nonconscious desire for a continuous and consistent self-image (remember the honor pledge mentioned in the previous lesson?), while salience affects people’s thinking and actions by manipulating their attention.
A distinction can be made, however, on the basis of the actual behavior targeted by nudges. According to Hansen and Jespersen, a nudge that works with System 2 and affects reflective choice or active response by the nudged can be termed a Type 2 nudge. Examples include color-coded calorie labels and using a descriptive norm to influence people’s towel reuse decision in a hotel room (e.g. “80% of our guests reuse their towels”). Type 1 nudges, on the other hand, don’t disrupt the choice context enough to create dissonance or reflection. In those instances, the targeted outcome is more automatic or the nudged’s reaction more passive. Examples include using small plates to reduce calorie intake and creating visual illusions to control traffic.
A similar differentiation between nudges has been offered by Cass Sunstein, who distinguishes between System 1 nudges, which are not educative and target or benefit from automatic processing, and System 2 nudges, which are educative and target or benefit from deliberative processing. Graphic warnings on cigarette packets are an example of the former, and the disclosure of health risks from smoking is an example of the latter. Surveys in different countries, particularly the US and Europe, have found greater public approval of System 2 than System 1 nudges (assuming they are equally effective), as well as greater approval for less intrusive nudges. On the whole, people across the world seem to be supportive of the use of nudges by governments, particularly against the alternative of ‘shoves’ (more interventionist and paternalist approaches, such as regulation or taxation). Naturally, these attitudes vary across countries (see Trivia 3 at the end of this topic).
Should questions about the ethical justifiability of behavioral interventions be based mainly on the views of academics, practitioners and policymakers? Clearly, the general public, who represent the nudged, are a stakeholder in the discourse on ethics. The extent to which public opinion should inform ethical legitimacy is a matter of debate, but public support can provide democratic justification for nudges more generally.
Before we look at the ethics of nudging, it’s useful to get an idea about the more general criticisms that have been raised about the approach.
Questions about the theoretical and practical value of nudging have been explored with respect to the following:
Other critiques of nudging address ethics more directly, particularly worries that nudges are manipulative, undermine individual agency and impose specific ideas about the “good life.” We will discuss these in the next sections, which outline key ethical concerns with respect to
Before we continue, let’s have another short quiz—again, just for fun.